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ABSTRACT 
 
In light of growing water scarcity, virtual water, or the water embedded in key water-intensive 
commodities, has been an active area of debate among practitioners and academics alike. As of yet, 
however, there is no consensus on whether water scarcity affects conflict behavior and we still lack 
empirical research intending to account for the role of virtual water in affecting the odds of 
militarized disputes between states.  Using quantitative methods and data on virtual water trade, we 
find that bilateral and multilateral trade openness reduce the probability of war between any given 
pair of country, which is consistent with the strategic role of this important commodity and the 
opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains.  We also find that the substantive effect of 
virtual water trade is comparable to that of oil and gas, the archetypal natural resources, in 
determining interstate conflicts’ probability.   
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank Group (2016), about 1.6 billion people live in countries with physical 
water scarcity, and in just two decades this number may double. Water scarcity can hamper growth 
prospects and some regions could see their growth rates decline by as much as 6 per cent of GDP by 
2050 as a result of water-related losses in agriculture, income and property. Yet, whereas about 70% 
of all (fresh) water is used for agriculture and food production around the world, international trade 
in physical water (in the form of bottled water or bulk water) is a limited phenomenon. Allan (1997) 
notes that food import of water scarce countries implies an import of the water embedded in the 
traded commodities. Virtual water trade (henceforth VWT) is the opportunity to minimize water 
consumption by increasing the import of goods that require a large amount of water in their 
production cycle (the so-called water-intensive products) and to limit the export of water-intensive 
goods.  
 
The sheer amount of VWT flows in 2015 alone substantial, about 1/5 of the total trade flows and 
twice the amount of trade in oil and gas.  It may then not come across surprising that recently the 
concept of VW has featured prominently in scientific and political debates (Allan et al., 2003). 
Given its importance, a number of recent studies has analyzed VWT using a variety of approaches 
(see e.g., Hoekstra and Hung, 2002; Lenzen, 2009; Konar et al., 2011; D’Odorico et al., 2012; Carr 
et al., 2013; Tamea et al., 2013 Porkka et al., 2013; Sartori and Schiavo, 2015; Metulini et al. 2016). 
Many studies and reports claim that VWT can improve food security by allowing water-scarce 
countries to benefit from water resources available elsewhere, thus addressing the requirements of a 
growing population (Godfray et al., 2010; Rosegrant et al., 2002).  Water is a very complex natural 
resource and a recent report of the United Sates Director of National Intelligence also links future 
shortage of water to an increased risk of armed conflict (DNI, 2012).  
 
In this study we address the following question: to what extent does VWT affect the odds of 
conflict between states? Our research question lies at the intersection of two separate yet 
intertwined strands of research: one on resource scarcity and conflict and one on trade and 
militarized interstate disputes. On the one hand, the so called "environmental scarcity" argument 
(see e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999) claims that a major cause of conflict has to be found in the steady 
depletion of environmental resources such as water, and the increasing pressure exerted by the 
overpopulation. Although Homer-Dixon (1999) predicts a steady increase in the incidence of 
violent conflict in coming decades as a consequence of environmental scarcity, he also 
acknowledges that there is no clear causal effect.  A large literature points out to the role of water 
scarcity in affecting human security through increased risk of conflict and refugee flows (e.g., 
Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; Warziniack, 2013). Although traditional sources of conflict still play a 
major role, there is also ample anecdotal evidence to believe that environmental degradation and 
contestation of water resources contribute to causing and fuelling many disputes. For example, 
UNEP (2007) claims that there is a very strong link between land degradation, desertification and 
conflict in Darfur. The droughts that affected the country in the 1980s and the ensuing migrations 
have greatly increased competition for water and land between farmers and herders. Syria is one of 
the largest consumer of freshwater resources and the lack of rainfall in recent years, combined with 
rising temperatures, could result in desertification of a great portion of land area. In the words of 
Devlin (2014, p.1), “the roots of political rebellion in Syria are integrally linked with access to 
water”.  
 
On the other hand, a well-established literature has explored the Liberal ‘‘Kantian Peace’’ that trade 
reduces the odds of militarized conflict, in particular between commercial partners (Dorussen, 2006; 
Hegre et al., 2010). This is because valuable gains from trade, in particular when commodities are 
strategic, would be lost in a conflict.1 Goenner (2010) further argues that commodities are 
heterogeneous in terms of importance, substitutability, and ease of expropriation and therefore have 
different effects on conflict.  Since the 1980 Carter doctrine, that claimed that the US would use all 
necessary means, including military forces, to fight any attempt to gain control of the Persian, a 
number of studies have explored the role of exhaustible mineral resources, such as oil and gas, in 
fuelling conflicts (e.g., Bove et al., 2015).  
 
There are however a number of shortcomings in the above strands of literature. First, most of the 
studies on the link water scarcity-conflict are case studies, often selected for their salience which 
may make them unrepresentative of other cases. Only few large-N studies examine the role that 
resource scarcity or abundance may play in conflicts. Most of these studies focus on water resources 
(Koubi et al., 2013) – thus further corroborating the prominence of this commodity in affecting 
violence - but there is ambiguous support for a role of water scarcity on conflicts (Nordås and 
Gleditsch, 2007). Second, and to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies exploring 
whether water scarcity has an effect on inter-state wars (as opposed to intra-state wars). Our study is 
                                                                 
1 There are actually two schools of thought. The liberal school emphasizes that trade integration reduces the use of force 
by increasing its opportunity costs (Levy, 2003), whereas the neo-Marxist school argues that trade integration reduces 
the dependence of any country from any single trade partner and thus reduces the opportunity costs of conflicts 
(Barbieri, 1996; 2002).   
a step in this direction. As water resources became scarce, countries become more likely to compete 
to secure their access to freshwater. Although water scarcity may not be the trigger of interstate 
disputes, it can compound other underlying economic factors to increase tensions. The Middle East 
and North Africa region, an historically arid or semi-arid area, has long been affected by global 
water crises. Population growth, pollution and weak institutions exacerbate water scarcity and could 
also make conflict between states more likely. For example, one of the causes of the Six Day War in 
1976 between Israel and Arab states was the struggle for water resources of the Jordan River and 
other rivers in the area.  The dispute began when Israel attempted to divert the Upper Jordan River 
to the National Water Carrier, a pipeline which carries water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev 
desert (Cohen, 1998). Similarly, despite the presence of a major river, Egypt’s supply of water is 
also very vulnerable as it is a downstream state; in fact, the country had threatened to go to war to 
protect its rights over the waters of the Nile several times, by e.g., destroying the dams that 
Ethiopia, a country located upstream, was planning to build (see e.g., Klare, 2001).   
 
Third, although the literature convincingly suggests that water scarcity and conflict are strictly 
intertwined and that trade matters for international security, little is know about the role of virtual 
water on foreign policy behavior.  Going back to Egypt’s example, as Garfinkel et al. (2015, p.100) 
eloquently put it, “the value of water to Egypt and the other up-stream countries depends not only 
on its importance as a basic need of life that is expected to rise as the populations of these countries 
continue to grow. It also depends on the degree of trade openness in these countries and the prices 
of traded goods that use water intensively as an input. For example, the world price of Egyptian 
cotton, a good that uses water as a main input, affects the value of the Nile's water flow to Egypt.”  
Allan (1997, 2003) claims that water-scarce countries in the Middle-East successfully compensated 
their fresh water shortages by importing virtual water, in the form of water intensive food products 
such as wheat and rice. Therefore, the virtual water value of a good or service as well as the relative 
scarcity of water resources can affect the way water is used and the political relations between 
trading partners.  Securing trade in virtual water becomes extremely important in presence of the 
current global water scarcity, in particular when imported and exported commodities use higher 
volumes of freshwater in the various steps of the production chain.   
 
If virtual water is indeed a scarce and strategic resource, and if “trade is more pacifying if states 
exchange more goods with high opportunity costs” (Dorussen, 2006, p.92), then our main 
expectation is that  virtual water trade reduces the likelihood of interstate conflict.  Recent studies 
have also argued that bilateral and multilateral trade openness might entail different strategic 
calculations, and that countries open to global trade have a higher probability of war because 
multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country (Martin et al., 
2008). We therefore use both measures of dependence to detect potentially different patterns. To 
anticipate, we find that virtual water is an important commodity and has effects comparable (or 
even stronger) to other prominent natural resources such as oil and gas in affecting interstate 
conflicts’ probability.   
 
2 Data and Methods 
 
Data on VWT are constructed using FAOSTAT commodities data and given the availability of data 
on VWT flows, our empirical analysis is limited to the period 1986–2000.  Data on bilateral trade 
flows, in particular total trade, oil and gas  (sitc4 33 and 34) and footwear (sitc4 85) come from 
Feenstra et al. (2005). Information on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are drawn from the 
Correlates of War Dataset (COW) and contain five possible hostility levels, ranging from 
the absence of militarized action (action type 1) to war (action type 5). War is defined as a conflict 
between two states with at least 1000 battle-deaths among military personnel.2 We follow Martin et 
al.’s (2008) approach and consider interstate conflicts all instances of militarize disputes with an 
hostility level above or equal to 3. Since the presence/absence of conflict within the same country 
pair over several years is likely to lead to serial correlation due to e.g., long-lasting disputes, we 
compute a second conflict variable measuring the onset of a conflict. After merging Feenstra et al.’s 
(2005) dataset with virtual water trade data, we end up with 175,357 observations, of which 0.444% 
(779) experienced an interstate war3. 
To quantify the impact of VWT on bilateral conflicts, we build on Martin et al. (2008), who offer a 
recent and comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of interstate conflict. We estimate 
a simple logit model with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by dyads. The model takes 
the following form: 
 
Logit(pijt) = αt  + β1NYPijt + β2UNCijt  + β3SDIijt + β4NOWijt + β5DNWijt + β6SARijt  + β7MMEijt  + β8DISTij + β9COMij  + 
β10CONij  + β11COLij + β12CCLij + β13FTAij + β14GATijt + β15DWLijt + β16TRADEijt  +εijt 
 
                                                                 
2 Examples of display of force (level 3 of an MID) include a decision of mobilization, a troop or ship movement, a border 
violation, or a border fortification. These are government-approved and un-accidental decisions. Examples of use of force 
(level 4 of a MID) include a blockade, an occupation of territory, or an attack. 
3 We use STATA 13 to carry the analyses. 
Our model also includes the number of years of peace between i and j (NYP); the level of political 
affinity between i and j (UNC)  the democracy index (SDI); the total number of MIDs (excluding 
their potential bilateral MID) which the countries of the pair are involved in at time t (NOW); the 
distance to the nearest current war which does not involve i or j (DNW); the sum of areas of the two 
countries (SAR, in logarithmic form); a dummy equal to 1 if i and j belong to a military alliance 
(MME). Moreover, the likelihood of military contests between pairs of countries is a function of a 
number of traditional gravity controls, such geographic distance (DIST, in logarithmic form), 
common language (COM), geographical contiguity (CON), colonial relationship (COL and CCL), 
free trade agreements (FTA) and the number of GATT/WTO  (GAT) members in the country pair. 
We also control for the temporal autocorrelation in military conflict by including a set of 10 
different dummies equal to 1 when the country pair was in MID in t −1, t −2, ...t −10, in order to 
address the crucial role of long lasting disputes (DWL). Table A-1 gives information on the name 
and definition of all the dependent and independent variables, including their sources. Our main 
explanatory variable is TRADE, which can be either bilateral trade openness (Bil_trade) or 
multilateral trade openness (Multi_trade). Bilateral trade openness is calculated in the following 
way: 
 
Bil_tradeijt = ln (impijt  / GDPjt + impjit / GDPit). 
 
This is the natural logarithm of the sum of imports that j receives from i over the GDP of the 
importing country j, and the imports that i receives from j over the GDP of the importing country i 
(see Martin et al., 2008). Multilateral trade openness is calculated as follows: 
 
Multi_tradeijt = ln (∑h≠i imphjt / GDPjt  + ∑k≠j impkit  / GDPit). 
 
This is natural the logarithm of the sum of imports j receives from all exporters h (excluding i) 
divided by the GDP of the importing country j, plus the sum of imports i receives from all exporters 
k  (excluding j) divided by the GDP of the importing country i: 
 
We construct these measures for both total trade, oil and gas trade as well as VWT. When dealing 
with VWT, note that this is expressed in quantity. Therefore, we divide bilateral and multilateral 
openness by total renewable water resource (TRWR) in order to standardize a measure expressed in 
quantity by another measure expressed in quantity (GDP is in terms of value).4 Note that we do not 
estimate bilateral and multilateral trade openness jointly in the same model as these measures are 
highly correlated, as Table A-2 in the appendix shows. As a robustness check, we restrict the 
sample to politically relevant dyads, when i and j are contiguous or when one of them is a major 
power. This sample restriction is often used by conflict researchers as such dyads are supposed to 
be more at risk of international conflict (e.g., Lemke and Reed, 2001; Bove and Gokmen, 2016). 
Note also that wars are overall rare events and many country pairs have zero bilateral trade flows. 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic model suffers from small-sample bias, which is 
aggravated by the rarity of ones in the sample. To mitigate the risk of bias due to the rare event 
distribution of our dependent variable, we adopt the bias correction approach proposed by Tomz et 
al. (2003), the so-called relogit, as an additional robustness check.   
 
The occurrences of conflict in the same country-pair are likely to be correlated due to long term 
disputes over several years. Although we address this issue by using the DWL dummies, we also 
estimate a logit model with onset of a conflict as a dependent variable, where MIDonset is equal to 1 
only if a specific dispute started at time t and zero otherwise (so both the absence of war and the 
continuation of existing wars are coded as zero). Finally, we introduce interaction terms between 
bilateral trade and contiguity, and between multilateral trade and contiguity, as the geographic 
proximity is likely to condition whether and how trade affects conflict (see e.g., Martin et al., 2008). 
The intuition is that the effect of trade on conflicts is stronger for contiguous pairs. 
 
3 Results and Discussion 
 
We start by looking at the effect of bilateral trade openness on bilateral conflict (Table 1), using 
data on VWT (columns 1-3), Oil and gas (columns 4-6), total trade (columns 7-9) and footwear 
(columns 10-11)5. We first estimate the model using the full sample, and then consider two sub-
samples of politically relevant dyads and contiguous pairs. The coefficient for bilateral VW trade 
(bil_vw) is negative and significant at the one percent level across all samples. We also find a 
negative, albeit generally insignificant, effect of oil trade (bil_oil&gas) on conflict. This is 
consistent with previous findings on the pacifying effect of trade, in particular trade in strategic 
commodities. The impact of total trade (bil_total) on conflict is statistically significant at 
convention level only in the sample of contiguous countries (column 9). Finally, when we consider 
                                                                 
4 We use the following transformation: Bil_tradeijt = ln (impijt / TRWRjt + impjit / TRWRit); Multi_tradeijt = ln (∑h≠i 
imphjt / TRWRjt  + ∑k≠j impkit  / TRWRit).  
5 Convergence is not achieved in the model using contiguous pairs and the measure of footwear trade 
a non-strategic commodity, footwear, we find that the effect of footwear trade (bil_footwear) on 
militarized dispute is not distinguishable from zero. This first round of results suggests that the 
prospects of an interruption of trade when goods are strategic and hard to substitute due e.g., to a 
relatively small number of sources, can deter bilateral conflict. 
 
To dig deeper into the relationship between trade and conflict, models in Table 2 replicate the 
models in Table 1 that make use of the full sample (i.e., columns 1, 4, 7 and 10), but introduce the 
interaction between contiguity and bilateral trade. Results clearly show how the effect of trade 
openness on conflict is higher for contiguous pairs. In fact, in this model bilateral trade openness is 
not significant, but the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically different from 
zero for VWT as well as for total trade. Thus, virtual water trade decreases the likelihood of war 
conditional on geographic proximity. The role of footwear trade and oil is still insignificant.  
 
As a first robustness check, we estimate the logit model without interaction terms as described 
above, by replacing the dependent variable MID with its onset. Because of space limitations, the 
results are provided in the Appendix (Table A-3). Our previous findings on the importance of 
virtual water are strongly borne out by this new set of empirical results. Countries that trade more 
virtual water bilaterally have a lower likelihood of war because of the opportunity costs associated 
with the loss of trade gains, in particular when supply may not easily respond to a loss of markets. 
As we mentioned above, the number of active militarized disputes is quite low, especially when we 
only take into account contiguous pairs. We therefore run a rare event logit model (Table A-4 in the 
appendix) on the full sample and on the relevant dyads using either virtual water trade or total trade 
and our results confirm the previous findings.6  
 
Another important question is whether multilateral trade openness, rather than bilateral dependence, 
can affect the odds of war between countries. Therefore, models in Table 3 replicate those in Table 
1 but replaces bilateral trade with multilateral trade. We consider the full sample model, a sub-
sample of relevant dyads, and one of contiguous pairs. The purpose of this extension is both to 
explore the robustness of the previous findings to changes in the way dependence is measured, and 
also to delve deeper into the underlying mechanisms for the results. 
 
The coefficients of VWT are all consistently negative and significant, suggesting that high level of 
both bilateral and multilateral trade openness decreases the probability of armed conflict. Oil has a 
                                                                 
6 Convergence is not achieved in models using contiguous pairs and  measures of trade in oil and footwear.  
similar negative coefficient, albeit insignificant in all but one sample (relevant dyads). Interestingly, 
when we move from strategic commodities to aggregate trade or non-strategic goods (i.e., footwear) 
multilateral trade openness decreases the probability of conflict, perhaps by reducing bilateral 
dependence to any given country and therefore the cost of a bilateral conflict, as Martin et al. (2008) 
suggests. One of the reason behind this discrepancy may be the fact that multilateral trade openness 
does not necessarily increase the autonomy of countries when they are heavily dependent on key 
commodities. In fact, losing an important supplier of oil or virtual water might cause high costs, 
even in presence of multiple trading partners, in particular in light of growing water scarcity.   
 
Finally, Table 4 explores the effect of the interaction between multilateral trade and the contiguity 
dummy on conflict. Using data on VWT, we find that high level of multilateral trade openness 
decreases the probability of MID for proximate countries, whereas the interaction is insignificant 
for all the other types of trade.  
  
As the coefficients in such non-linear models cannot be interpreted as slopes or elasticities (only 
their signs and standard errors allow for a direct reading), we present substantive quantities of 
interest, or marginal effects. We first analyze the marginal effect of bilateral trade openness for the 
coefficients reported in Table 1 (see Table 5, columns 1--3 and 7--9) using the full sample, as well 
as the relevant dyads sample and restricting the sample to contiguous pairs only. Although the 
absolute probabilities are small as wars between countries are rare overall, the likelihood of MID in 
the full sample decreases by a factor of about 0.19 when bilateral VWT is raised from its minimum 
to its maximum. Considering the relevant dyads only, the likelihood of MID decreases by a factor 
of 3.50. Moving to the multilateral trade effect (Table 5, columns 4--6 and 10--12), the likelihood of 
MID decrease by 0.14 percentage points in the full sample and 2.14 points in the sample of relevant 
dyads when multilateral VWT openness is raised from its minimum to its maximum.  Moreover, the 
effects of VWT and oil&gas trade on conflict are of similar magnitude (and actually the magnitude 
of the effect of VWT is slightly larger that  that of oil&gas trade), as we can see from results 
reported in Table 5. In Table A-5 and A-6 we report the marginal effects that largely corroborate 
our previous findings.   
 
4 Conclusions 
 
Water scarcity is one of the main challenges for sustainable development, and this problem is likely 
to exacerbate as a result of climate change, population growth, rapid urbanization in many countries 
and the pollution of rivers and lakes in developing economies. Failing to address this issue can have 
important consequences on human security and geopolitical stability. Many countries, in particular 
those in arid regions, depend heavily on importing hidden virtual water, the freshwater used to 
produce goods in the exporting country.  We explore whether and to what extent virtual water trade 
affects the odds of interstate conflicts. We explore the role of both bilateral and multilateral trade 
openness and compare virtual water to another strategic commodity, oil, and to a non-strategic 
commodity, footwear. We find that bilateral virtual water trade openness reduces the chances that 
countries are involved into bilateral wars by affecting the opportunity costs of the conflict. The 
effect is particularly pronounced for relevant dyads, i.e., contiguous states and the superpowers. We 
also find that the impact of virtual water is comparable to that of oil.   
 
As bilateral trade openness alone may not efficiently capture the complex interdependencies 
between states, we also use a measure of multilateral trade openness and find that it has the same 
effect of decreasing the propensity of conflict when it is computed using data on virtual water. This 
last result stands in contrast to the effect of multilateral total trade openness, which has a positive 
impact on conflict, as it reduces the opportunity cost with any given country, as the recent research 
on this topic suggests. As such, our study help shedding light on the heterogeneity of trade effects 
when moving from total trade to lower levels of aggregation.  
 
Although militarized disputes are rare events (only 0.4 percent of the cases in our sample are coded 
as 1) and the probabilities estimated by any statistical model are small, we find that – among 
relevant dyads - the magnitude of the effect stands to about 3.5 percentage point decrease in the 
likelihood of conflicts when bilateral VWT is raised from its minimum to its maximum. Overall, 
our results hold up well to a series of specification checks. Because of the limited number of 
empirical works and the lack of consensus on whether water scarcity affects conflicts, we believe 
there is an interesting agenda for future research in this topic area. Given a lack of more 
disaggregated data, we are unable to investigate the mechanisms underlying the effect of VWT on 
conflict. We do not know, for example, to what extent virtual water trade depends on water-
intensive food more specifically.  Food insecurity can well be the cause of conflict and trigger an 
array of responses. Due to likely different theoretical mechanisms than those we presented here, 
examining this important channel is beyond the scope of this article, but we hope to address this in 
future work. 
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Table 1. Trade and MID: bilateral trade openness.7 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 full rel.dyads contig full rel.dyads contig full rel.dyads contig full rel.dyads 
bil_vw -0.072** -0.166*** -0.230*** 
  
  
  
  
  
 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.062) 
  
  
  
  
  bil_oil&gas   
 
  -0.049 -0.218* -0.082 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  (0.106) (0.124) (0.394) 
  
  
  bil_total   
 
  
  
  0.005 -0.132 -0.305*** 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  (0.069) (0.081) (0.104) 
  bil_ 
footwear   
 
  
  
  
  
  0.275 0.279 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  (0.189) (0.245) 
NYP -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.015** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.109 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.047*** -0.023** -0.018 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.079) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) 
UNC -0.988*** -0.748** -0.949* 0.231 -0.479 -1.159 -0.615** -0.406 0.415 -0.535 -1.565 
 
(0.290) (0.362) (0.573) (0.556) (0.663) (4.001) (0.302) (0.346) (0.619) (0.981) (1.049) 
SDI -0.013 -0.107 -0.244 0.330 0.077 0.831 0.524** 0.421 0.388 0.641 1.290 
 
(0.240) (0.282) (0.373) (0.476) (0.665) (1.144) (0.260) (0.318) (0.422) (0.913) (1.384) 
NOW 0.247*** 0.213*** 0.107** 0.297*** 0.300*** 0.289* 0.292*** 0.288*** 0.199*** 0.261*** 0.199** 
 
(0.021) (0.053) (0.045) (0.036) (0.066) (0.152) (0.019) (0.033) (0.037) (0.068) (0.100) 
DNW -0.140 -0.429*** -0.517** 0.213 -0.689** -2.311** -0.240 -0.573*** -0.822*** -0.203 -0.823** 
 
(0.140) (0.162) (0.201) (0.332) (0.350) (1.094) (0.179) (0.205) (0.308) (0.458) (0.362) 
SAR 0.090* 0.118 0.127 0.068 0.363*** 1.128 0.094 0.092 0.269 0.208 0.217 
 
(0.049) (0.073) (0.120) (0.078) (0.137) (0.745) (0.057) (0.096) (0.188) (0.138) (0.210) 
MME 0.478** 0.486** 0.573** 0.768** 0.812** -1.598 0.615** 0.743*** 0.560 -0.131 -0.345 
 
(0.218) (0.234) (0.249) (0.322) (0.363) (1.293) (0.256) (0.262) (0.400) (0.608) (0.710) 
DIST -0.693*** -0.658*** -0.592* -0.850*** -1.359*** -4.763** -0.785*** -0.615** -0.821 -0.712* -0.758* 
 
(0.157) (0.201) (0.359) (0.279) (0.389) (2.165) (0.173) (0.263) (0.657) (0.420) (0.449) 
COM 0.375 0.291 0.189 0.538 0.829 1.722 0.870*** 0.919** 0.377 0.368 1.138 
 
(0.260) (0.269) (0.302) (0.576) (0.681) (1.743) (0.307) (0.396) (0.519) (0.774) (0.697) 
CON 0.892*** 0.784** \ 0.080 0.307 \ 0.812** 1.033** \ 0.045 0.367 
 
(0.312) (0.380) \ (0.482) (0.470) \ (0.355) (0.414) \ (0.844) (0.743) 
COL 0.815*** 0.260 0.674* 0.354 -0.195 -0.818 0.360 -0.036 0.035 0.829 -0.190 
 
(0.261) (0.267) (0.350) (0.455) (0.511) (0.848) (0.298) (0.301) (0.392) (0.969) (1.043) 
CCL 0.385 0.286 0.132 \ \ \ 0.112 0.083 -0.240 \ \ 
 
(0.316) (0.392) (0.405) \ \ \ (0.417) (0.539) (0.557) \ \ 
FTA -0.187 -0.203 -0.143 -1.006* -0.279 2.305 -0.542 -0.672 -0.101 -1.069 -0.618 
 
(0.347) (0.329) (0.409) (0.599) (0.675) (2.930) (0.488) (0.493) (0.609) (0.930) (1.064) 
GAT 0.196 0.094 0.030 0.094 -0.135 -1.254 0.126 0.072 -0.006 -0.246 -1.183** 
 
(0.181) (0.198) (0.206) (0.355) (0.502) (1.072) (0.211) (0.255) (0.310) (0.591) (0.594) 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Obs. 37,398 7,385 1,633 6,675 2,577 555 42,061 6,928 1,174 3,781 1,516 
# MID=1 315 225 137 118 93 37 260 166 86 60 53 
dummies t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 
R^2 0.568 0.466 0.410 0.562 0.539 0.640 0.612 0.521 0.505 0.433 0.406 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
                                                                 
7 When the coefficient is not estimated because of multicollinearity issue, we report a text line break 
Table 2. Trade and MID: interactions between bilateral trade openness and contiguity. 
  1 2 3 4 
 
vw oil&gas Total footwear 
bil_vw 0.006 
   
 
(0.034) 
   bil_oil&gas   0.048 
  
 
  (0.125) 
  bil_total   
 
0.119 
 
 
  
 
(0.079) 
 bil_footwear   
  
0.250 
interaction bil_vw /CON 
  
  
(0.195) 
-0.271*** 
   
 
(0.073) 
   interaction bil_oil&gas / CON   -0.269 
  
 
  (0.166) 
  interaction bil_total/ CON   
 
-0.394*** 
 
 
  
 
(0.131) 
 interaction bil_footwear / 
CON   
  
0.186 
 
  
  
(0.376) 
NYP -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.023** 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) 
UNC -1.037*** 0.227 -0.538* -0.582 
 
(0.281) (0.553) (0.303) (0.972) 
SDI -0.052 0.380 0.508* 0.669 
 
(0.241) (0.457) (0.260) (0.907) 
NOW 0.245*** 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.260*** 
 
(0.021) (0.036) (0.019) (0.067) 
DNW -0.150 0.219 -0.201 -0.199 
 
(0.139) (0.330) (0.176) (0.453) 
SAR 0.099** 0.080 0.086 0.213 
 
(0.050) (0.077) (0.056) (0.144) 
MME 0.425** 0.724** 0.553** -0.146 
 
(0.205) (0.315) (0.258) (0.585) 
DIST -0.691*** -0.762*** -0.751*** -0.735* 
 
(0.152) (0.269) (0.170) (0.433) 
COM 0.405* 0.552 0.862*** 0.369 
 
(0.240) (0.566) (0.302) (0.770) 
CON 4.688*** -1.678 -0.942 1.658 
 
(1.034) (1.315) (0.665) (2.965) 
COL 0.904*** 0.489 0.346 0.866 
 
(0.252) (0.459) (0.291) (0.970) 
CCL 0.311 \ -0.087 \ 
 
(0.326) \ (0.483) \ 
FTA -0.011 -0.852 -0.372 -1.057 
 
(0.349) (0.603) (0.475) (0.934) 
GAT 0.114 -0.055 0.038 -0.255 
 
(0.178) (0.338) (0.210) (0.591) 
 
  
   Obs. 37,398 6,675 42,061 3,781 
# MID=1 315 118 260 60 
dummies t yes yes Yes yes 
DWL yes yes Yes yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.573 0.564 0.615 0.434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 3. Trade and MID: multilateral trade openness. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
full rel.dyads contig full rel.dyads contig full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads 
                        
multi_vw -0.118** -0.204*** -0.212***   
  
  
  
  
 
 
(0.052) (0.063) (0.079)   
  
  
  
  
 multi_ 
oil&gas   
  
-0.061 -0.238* -0.532   
  
  
 
 
  
  
(0.114) (0.137) (0.387)   
  
  
 multi_total   
  
  
  
0.398** 0.579** -0.855   
 
 
  
  
  
  
(0.187) (0.229) (0.552)   
 multi_ 
footwear   
  
  
  
  
  
0.682* 0.702** 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.377) (0.331) 
NYP -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.016** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.112 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.046** -0.021** -0.017 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.086) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) 
UNC -0.976*** -0.630* -0.912 0.393 0.134 0.804 -0.780** -0.648* 0.629 -1.435 -2.571** 
 
(0.292) (0.357) (0.583) (0.513) (0.688) (3.808) (0.304) (0.360) (0.669) (1.252) (1.237) 
SDI -0.050 -0.182 -0.319 0.338 0.195 1.341 0.475* 0.257 0.246 0.599 1.255 
 
(0.243) (0.281) (0.373) (0.494) (0.671) (1.153) (0.262) (0.335) (0.396) (0.911) (1.452) 
NOW 0.248*** 0.207*** 0.107** 0.300*** 0.290*** 0.341* 0.292*** 0.283*** 0.193*** 0.249*** 0.202* 
 
(0.021) (0.051) (0.046) (0.037) (0.059) (0.179) (0.019) (0.034) (0.041) (0.066) (0.107) 
DNW -0.181 -0.461*** -0.500** 0.193 -0.683* -2.701** -0.196 -0.543*** -1.013*** -0.156 -0.919** 
 
(0.151) (0.172) (0.214) (0.337) (0.370) (1.341) (0.176) (0.201) (0.355) (0.528) (0.385) 
SAR 0.065 0.074 0.043 0.071 0.310** 1.297* 0.117** 0.115 0.271 0.214 0.247 
 
(0.051) (0.074) (0.123) (0.078) (0.133) (0.783) (0.057) (0.096) (0.205) (0.132) (0.198) 
MME 0.468** 0.443** 0.602** 0.738** 0.681* -1.785 0.635** 0.781*** 0.487 0.393 0.274 
 
(0.207) (0.219) (0.249) (0.332) (0.355) (1.263) (0.257) (0.253) (0.403) (0.527) (0.593) 
DIST -0.662*** -0.532*** -0.328 -0.807*** -0.955** -4.753** -0.807*** -0.497* -0.787 
-
0.972*** -1.020** 
 
(0.157) (0.192) (0.380) (0.306) (0.431) (2.261) (0.171) (0.261) (0.791) (0.352) (0.433) 
COM 0.350 0.252 0.085 0.514 0.674 1.404 0.834*** 0.770** 0.535 0.528 1.324* 
 
(0.257) (0.270) (0.314) (0.565) (0.637) (1.638) (0.314) (0.383) (0.520) (0.812) (0.730) 
CON 0.782** 0.596* \ 0.159 0.557 \ 0.841** 1.232*** \ 0.391 0.765 
 
(0.305) (0.346) \ (0.496) (0.552) \ (0.357) (0.429) \ (0.864) (0.805) 
COL 0.781*** 0.155 0.457 0.240 -0.486 -1.744 0.438 -0.012 -0.008 0.861 -0.232 
 
(0.266) (0.270) (0.331) (0.458) (0.570) (1.073) (0.307) (0.323) (0.392) (0.999) (1.022) 
CCL 0.433 0.319 0.228 \ \ \ 0.154 0.356 -0.054 \ \ 
 
(0.314) (0.377) (0.377) \ \ \ (0.411) (0.482) (0.432) \ \ 
FTA -0.203 -0.247 -0.233 -1.070* -0.399 2.338 -0.521 -0.650 -0.345 -1.257 -0.753 
 
(0.345) (0.326) (0.386) (0.572) (0.632) (2.559) (0.473) (0.479) (0.655) (0.923) (1.190) 
GAT 0.172 0.045 0.036 0.142 -0.135 -1.607* 0.210 0.240 0.030 -0.113 -1.101* 
 
(0.180) (0.200) (0.206) (0.354) (0.494) (0.877) (0.210) (0.265) (0.308) (0.591) (0.669) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 Obs. 37,036 7,365 1,619 6,637 2,550 539 42,058 6,927 1,173 3,758 1,503 
# MID=1 315 225 137 118 93 37 260 166 86 60 53 
dummies t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWL Yes Yes      Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes      Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 
R^2 0.570 0.461 0.397 0.566 0.545 0.653 0.614 0.526 0.501 0.444 0.420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           
Table 4. Trade and MID: interactions between multilateral trade openness and contiguity. 
  1 2 3 4 
  vw oil&gas total footwear 
multi_vw -0.035 
     (0.055) 
   multi_oil&gas 
 
0.020 
    
 
(0.139) 
  multi_total 
  
0.456** 
   
  
(0.181) 
 multi_footwear 
   
0.664 
  
   
(0.415) 
Interaction multi_vw / CON -0.219** 
     (0.085) 
   Interaction multi_oil&gas /CON 
 
-0.240 
    
 
(0.237) 
  Interaction multi_total/CON 
  
-0.590 
   
  
(0.400) 
 Interaction multi_footwear / 
CON 
   
0.106 
  
   
(0.616) 
NYP -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.021** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) 
UNC -1.010*** 0.360 -0.808*** -1.436 
  (0.289) (0.513) (0.311) (1.253) 
SDI -0.092 0.369 0.445* 0.594 
  (0.244) (0.487) (0.263) (0.913) 
NOW 0.245*** 0.300*** 0.293*** 0.248*** 
  (0.021) (0.038) (0.019) (0.067) 
DNW -0.193 0.146 -0.220 -0.148 
  (0.150) (0.346) (0.179) (0.521) 
SAR 0.081 0.074 0.113** 0.216 
  (0.050) (0.076) (0.056) (0.135) 
MME 0.456** 0.751** 0.614** 0.404 
  (0.204) (0.336) (0.265) (0.536) 
DIST -0.684*** -0.784** -0.808*** -0.977*** 
  (0.154) (0.307) (0.171) (0.358) 
COM 0.350 0.533 0.851*** 0.545 
  (0.253) (0.568) (0.314) (0.789) 
CON 4.683*** -0.499 0.703** 1.034 
  (1.581) (0.894) (0.354) (3.926) 
COL 0.809*** 0.250 0.446 0.838 
  (0.262) (0.477) (0.306) (1.035) 
CCL 0.387 \ 0.076 \ 
  (0.320) \ (0.428) \ 
FTA -0.160 -1.077* -0.523 -1.254 
  (0.345) (0.569) (0.474) (0.911) 
GAT 0.134 0.065 0.172 -0.127 
  (0.180) (0.359) (0.209) (0.603) 
  
    Obs. 37,036 6,637 42,058 3,758 
# MID=1 315 118 260 60 
dummies t Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWL Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.571 0.567 0.615 0.444 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 5. First Difference Estimates based on Table 1 and Table 3.  
 Virtual 
Water 
Full sample        Relevant dyads       
bilateral multilateral bilateral multilateral 
  First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up 
bil_trade -0,18 -0,30 -0,03    -3,50 -7,37 -1,21    
multi_trade    -0,14 -0,30 -0,03    -2,06 -4,14 -0,70 
NYP -0,29 -0,45 -0,16 -0,28 -0,45 -0,16 -0,91 -1,50 -0,38 -0,98 -1,54 -0,46 
UNC -0,21 -0,39 -0,07 -0,20 -0,39 -0,07 -0,77 -1,71 -0,11 -0,63 -1,44 -0,04 
SDI 0,00 -0,09 0,04 -0,01 -0,09 0,04 -0,15 -0,81 0,32 -0,28 -0,99 0,24 
NOW 99,59 98,77 99,92 99,59 98,77 99,92 96,22 77,71 99,84 95,63 74,63 99,83 
DNW -0,04 -0,13 0,02 -0,05 -0,13 0,02 -0,86 -1,55 -0,34 -0,96 -1,72 -0,37 
SAR 0,13 -0,03 0,21 0,09 -0,03 0,21 0,96 0,00 2,33 0,56 -0,36 1,64 
MME 0,04 0,01 0,09 0,04 0,01 0,09 0,28 0,06 0,55 0,25 0,04 0,48 
DIST -1,15 -2,25 -0,31 -0,98 -2,25 -0,31 -5,62 -13,20 -1,29 -3,64 -8,63 -0,76 
COM 0,03 -0,01 0,08 0,03 -0,01 0,08 0,16 -0,06 0,44 0,14 -0,10 0,44 
CON 0,12 0,02 0,21 0,10 0,02 0,21 0,51 0,08 1,11 0,37 0,01 0,86 
COL 0,10 0,03 0,18 0,09 0,03 0,18 0,17 -0,09 0,48 0,12 -0,11 0,45 
CCL 0,04 -0,01 0,11 0,04 -0,01 0,11 0,21 -0,16 0,75 0,22 -0,15 0,77 
FTA -0,01 -0,04 0,03 -0,01 -0,04 0,03 -0,07 -0,30 0,21 -0,09 -0,31 0,19 
GAT 0,02 -0,02 0,05 0,02 -0,02 0,05 0,06 -0,29 0,32 0,01 -0,37 0,29 
 
 Oil&gas 
Full sample        Relevant dyads       
bilateral     multilateral     bilateral     multilateral     
  
First 
Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up First Dif. 
CI 
low CI up 
Bil_trade -0,06 -0,42 0,25    -0,74 -2,18 -0,03    
Multi_trade    -0,10 -0,39 0,09    -0,41 -1,09 -0,02 
NYP -0,61 -1,14 -0,26 -0,62 -1,14 -0,27 -0,70 -1,33 -0,27 -0,71 -1,40 -0,24 
UNC 0,02 -0,17 0,20 0,05 -0,10 0,19 -0,10 -0,57 0,24 0,07 -0,27 0,44 
SDI 0,03 -0,16 0,18 0,04 -0,12 0,19 -0,06 -0,64 0,32 -0,02 -0,58 0,34 
NOW 80,44 52,69 95,73 79,97 52,84 95,87 73,91 28,74 97,79 69,81 22,84 96,64 
DNW 0,17 -0,12 0,73 0,18 -0,13 0,80 -0,56 -1,40 -0,10 -0,58 -1,41 -0,11 
SAR 0,20 -0,06 0,58 0,17 -0,12 0,52 2,79 0,41 7,97 2,10 0,24 6,78 
MME 0,09 0,01 0,22 0,08 0,01 0,21 0,11 0,00 0,27 0,09 0,00 0,24 
DIST -1,83 -5,08 -0,29 -1,72 -5,27 -0,17 -12,61 -38,60 -1,24 -5,83 -21,20 -0,23 
COM 0,11 -0,03 0,31 0,10 -0,01 0,30 0,17 -0,05 0,49 0,13 -0,06 0,40 
CON 0,03 -0,05 0,16 0,04 -0,06 0,20 0,06 -0,07 0,24 0,11 -0,05 0,34 
COL 0,04 -0,04 0,18 0,03 -0,05 0,14 -0,03 -0,16 0,09 -0,06 -0,17 0,06 
CCL \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ 
FTA -0,09 -0,18 0,00 -0,09 -0,18 -0,01 -0,05 -0,25 0,11 -0,07 -0,26 0,07 
GAT 0,01 -0,15 0,12 0,01 -0,14 0,11 -0,12 -0,80 0,18 -0,09 -0,62 0,19 
Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to facilitate the interpretations 
CI lower and CI upper pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals. 
 
     
 
  
 
Appendix 
 
Table A-1. List of explanatory variables 
 
Variable Description Sources and notes 
MID 1 = No militarized action, 2 = Threat to use force, 3 = 
Display of force, 4 = Use of force, and 5 = War .  
Ratio of ones: 0.444 % (total of 779) 
Correlates of War Dataset (COW) 
 
MIDonset It takes on value 1 only when in year t the country 
has MID = 1 and in t-1 MID = 0 (no conflicts) 
Ratio of ones: 0.244 % (total of 428) 
DIST Geodesic distances, calculated following the great 
circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of 
the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of 
population) 
CEPII, geodist database (Mayer, Zignago,2011) 
(www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm, 
accessed on 02/2015) 
COL A country pair dummy representing whether one was 
a colony of the other at some point in time. 
CON Country pair dummy represents whether the two 
countries have a common border 
CCL Country pair dummy represents  whether the two 
have been colonized by a same third country 
COM Country pair dummy represents whether the two 
countries speak the same official language. 
RTA Common membership in a regional trade area 
NYP The number of years of peace between the two 
countries 
Martin et al. (2008) 
SDI The democracy index for each country, taken from 
the Polity IV database. We use the composite index 
that ranks each country on a − 10 to +10 scale in 
terms of democratic institutions.  
UNC The correlation between countries' positions during 
votes on resolutions in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. 
NOW The total number of MIDs (excluding their potential 
bilateral MID) which the countries of the pair are 
involved in at time t. 
DNW The distance to the nearest current war which does 
not involve a country from the pair 
SAR The sum of areas of the two countries (in log). 
MME A dummy for those country pairs belonging to a 
military alliance 
GAT A variable counting the number of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade 
Organization (GATT/WTO) 
DWL List of dummies expressing whether a conflict was 
present in the dyad 1, 2, …, t years before.   
Bil_trade The ratio of imports j receives from i over the GDP 
of the importing country j, computed in different 
times t. 
Imports: NBER-UN Trade Data set 
(http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.
html, accessed on 04/2015, Feenstra et al., 
2005). Data on oil and gas trade are extracted 
based on the SITC4 codes of the commodities 
traded8. 
Data on VWT are based on the commodity 
trade dataset of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO, 
Statistics Division. FAOSTAT online database. 
(http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html, 
accessed on 9/2013.). Detailed international 
trade is available at the annual time scale from 
1986 to 2011 and express the quantity of 
agricultural commodity k traded in year t from 
country i to country j. Trade data are converted 
into virtual water flows by multiplying traded 
quantities by the crop virtual water content (in 
m3), assuming that commodities are produced 
in the countries of origin of the flows. The total 
VW trade is then obtained by summing across 
all commodities, i.e. The considered crop 
virtual water content is the sum of green and 
blue water9 GDP: World Bank 
Multi_trade The sum of imports j receives from all exporters h 
(excluding i) divided by the GDP of the importing 
country j computed in different times t. 
                                                                 
8 Data utilized for the category “trade in oil and gas” are those extracted under the SITC4 code Division: 33 (“Petroleum, 
petroleum products and related materials”) and Division: 34 (“Gas, natural and manufactured”). 
9 The water footprint of a product is the volume of water needed to produce the product. The ‘blue’ water footprint refers to 
the volume of surface and groundwater consumed (evaporated) as a result of the production of a good; the ‘green’ water 
footprint refers to the rain-water consumed. The ‘grey’ water footprint of a product refers to the volume of freshwater that is 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
MKTP.CD, accessed on 02/2015.) GDP at 
current price (US $) 
 
TRWR The sum of internal renewable water resources 
(IRWR) and external renewable water resources 
(ERWR). It corresponds to the maximum theoretical 
yearly amount of water available for a country at a 
given moment and it is calculated as total renewable 
surface water + total renewable groundwater -  the 
overlap between surface water and groundwater. 
Data are in 10^9 m3/yr and comes from 
AQUASTAT FAO main database 
(http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/quer
y/index.html, accessed on 03/2016). Data are 
averaged over 5- years period (1988-1992, 
1993-1997, 1998-2002).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
required to assimilate the load of pollutants based on existing ambient water quality standards – please see Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra (2011). 
Table A-2. Correlation coefficients among bilateral trade and multilateral trade openness 
measures, using the full sample. 
  multi_footwear multi_oil&gas multi_total multi_vw bil_vw bil_oil&gas bil_total 
multi_oil&gas 0.117 
      multi_total 0.335 0.617 
     multi_vw 0.093 0.380 0.444 
    bil_vw 0.037 0.281 0.339 0.602 
   bil_oil&gas -0.028 0.219 0.223 0.045 0.415 
  bil_total -0.113 0.134 0.220 0.123 0.489 0.654 
 
bil_footwear 0.127 0.029 0.123 0.118 0.296 0.345 0.410 
 
  
Table A-3. Trade and MID: bilateral trade openness. MIDonset is the dependent variable. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads 
                        
bil_vw -0.052 -0.142*** -0.245*** 
  
  
  
  
    (0.036) (0.045) (0.071) 
  
  
  
  
  bil_ 
oil&gas 
  
  0.009 -0.157 0.075 
  
  
    
  
  (0.103) (0.123) (0.610) 
  
  
  bil_total 
  
  
  
  0.015 -0.138 -0.330** 
    
  
  
  
  (0.078) (0.086) (0.145) 
  bil_ 
footwear 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.123 0.203 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (0.172) (0.238) 
NYP -0.016*** -0.011** -0.013* -0.024*** -0.028** -0.104 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.045*** -0.026* -0.023 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.073) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
UNC -0.951*** -0.694* -1.160* 0.056 -0.606 1.081 -0.709** -0.390 -0.085 0.077 -0.626 
  (0.313) (0.382) (0.603) (0.565) (0.668) (4.623) (0.334) (0.366) (0.719) (0.965) (1.096) 
SDI 0.124 0.181 -0.044 0.713 0.286 -0.195 0.510 0.561 0.798 0.871 1.855 
  (0.275) (0.321) (0.422) (0.491) (0.740) (1.774) (0.328) (0.418) (0.556) (0.912) (1.544) 
NOW 0.224*** 0.182*** 0.083** 0.288*** 0.291*** 0.252 0.267*** 0.258*** 0.164*** 0.230** 0.155 
  (0.021) (0.054) (0.037) (0.039) (0.052) (0.169) (0.017) (0.027) (0.041) (0.095) (0.102) 
DNW -0.096 -0.379** -0.426** 0.165 -0.785* -1.377 -0.218 -0.564** -0.729** 0.041 -0.581* 
  (0.174) (0.191) (0.210) (0.374) (0.406) (1.234) (0.206) (0.233) (0.333) (0.485) (0.348) 
SAR 0.114** 0.135 0.032 0.116 0.375** 0.693 0.150** 0.160* 0.190 0.268 0.275 
  (0.053) (0.087) (0.133) (0.087) (0.146) (0.802) (0.058) (0.096) (0.222) (0.204) (0.261) 
MME 0.328 0.225 0.319 0.608 0.814 -1.537 0.518* 0.481 0.240 0.274 0.223 
  (0.260) (0.278) (0.306) (0.415) (0.504) (1.461) (0.307) (0.364) (0.553) (0.707) (0.856) 
DIST -0.786*** -0.806*** -0.431 -0.836*** -1.264*** -2.877 -0.886*** -0.696*** -0.263 -0.916* -0.847 
  (0.163) (0.218) (0.413) (0.299) (0.448) (1.805) (0.180) (0.270) (0.715) (0.473) (0.635) 
COM 0.123 0.127 -0.061 0.332 0.691 2.317 0.438 0.483 0.055 0.278 1.180 
  (0.321) (0.337) (0.379) (0.656) (0.812) (1.972) (0.352) (0.432) (0.691) (0.789) (0.817) 
CON 1.091*** 0.866** \ -0.216 0.167 \ 0.812* 1.149** \  0.135 0.367 
  (0.389) (0.432) \ (0.607) (0.626) \ (0.443) (0.471)  \ (1.136) (0.892) 
COL 0.586 0.096 0.560 0.148 -0.538 -1.161 0.339 -0.099 -0.201 0.703 -0.498 
  (0.357) (0.328) (0.403) (0.641) (0.701) (1.345) (0.389) (0.352) (0.461) (1.003) (0.989) 
CCL 0.500 0.225 0.139 \ \ \ 0.346 0.167 0.077 \ \ 
  (0.402) (0.478) (0.535) \ \ \ (0.570) (0.659) (0.795) \ \ 
FTA -0.047 -0.145 0.247 -1.082 -0.461 1.017 -0.525 -0.691 0.021 -1.568 -1.318 
  (0.360) (0.389) (0.482) (0.699) (0.810) (3.669) (0.534) (0.621) (0.910) (0.995) (1.134) 
GAT -0.037 -0.115 -0.215 -0.439 -0.722 -1.140 -0.173 -0.196 -0.584 -0.472 -1.556** 
  (0.198) (0.215) (0.245) (0.326) (0.491) (0.856) (0.220) (0.265) (0.374) (0.647) (0.748) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Obs. 37,398 7,385 1,633 6,675 2,383 440 42,061 6,928 1,109 3,484 1,364 
# MID=1 185 132 75 79 62 21 158 100 46 43 38 
dummies t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DWL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo 
R^2 0.409 0.301 0.245 0.510 0.505 0.585 0.483 0.386 0.356 0.385 0.385 
          Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           
Table A-4. Trade and MID: bilateral trade openness. Relogit. 
  1 2 3 4 
  full rel. dyads full rel.dyads 
bil_vw -0.070** -0.159***   
  (0.033) (0.042)   
bil_total   0.011 -0.120 
    (0.069) (0.081) 
NYP -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
UNC -0.984*** -0.723** -0.620** -0.416 
  (0.290) (0.360) (0.302) (0.344) 
SDI 0.025 -0.125 0.490* 0.364 
  (0.239) (0.280) (0.260) (0.315) 
NOW 0.241*** 0.203*** 0.283*** 0.268*** 
  (0.021) (0.053) (0.019) (0032) 
DNW -0.125 -0.402 -0.217 -0.516*** 
  (0.140) (0.161) (0.179) (0.203) 
SAR 0.090* 0.117 0.093 0.090 
  (0.049) (0.073) (0.057) (0.095) 
MME 0.470** 0.474** 0.605** 0.710*** 
  (0.218) (0.232) (0.256) (0.260) 
DIST -0.691*** -0.646 -0.777*** -0.613** 
 
(0.157) (0.200) (0.173) (0.261) 
COM 0.379 0.291 
  0.860*** 
(0.306) 
0.889** 
  (0.394) 
  (0.260) (0.267)   
CON 0.872*** 0.754** 0.789** 0.945** 
  (0.311) (0.378) (0.354) (0.411) 
COL 0.805*** 0.265 0.343 -0.021 
  (0.260) (0.265) (0.298) (0.299) 
CCL 0.391 0.294 0.130 0.082 
  (0.316) (0.389) (0.416) (0.535) 
FTA -0.162 -0.175 -0.401 -0.580 
  (0.347) (0.327) (0.487) (0.489) 
GAT 0.174 0.069 0.094 0.036 
  (0.466) (0.197) (0.211) (0.255) 
  
    Obs. 37,398 7,385 42,061 6,928 
# MID=1 315 225 260 166 
dummies t yes yes yes yes 
DWL yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R^2 
 
0,568 0,466 0,612 0,521 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Table A-5. Marginal effects of coefficients in Table 1. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig 
bil_vw -5.36e-05** -0.000803*** -0.00486*** 
  
  
  
  
  (2.61e-05) (0.000242) (0.00155) 
  
  
  
  
bil_ 
oil&gas 
  
  -5.21e-05 -0.000352* -5.69e-06 
  
  
  
  
  (0.000111) (0.000199) (2.15e-05) 
  
  
bil_total 
  
  
  
  1.72e-06 -0.000283 -0.00172* 
  
  
  
  
  (2.54e-05) (0.000191) (0.00102) 
NYP -1.47e-05*** -6.35e-05*** -0.000321** -2.68e-05*** -3.98e-05** -7.54e-06 -8.20e-06*** -4.42e-05*** -0.000265** 
  (3.06e-06) (1.88e-05) (0.000126) (8.17e-06) (1.56e-05) (2.30e-05) (1.86e-06) (1.16e-05) (0.000105) 
UNC -0.000735*** -0.00362* -0.0201* 0.000247 -0.000773 -8.02e-05 -0.000227* -0.000872 0.00234 
  (0.000251) (0.00189) (0.0121) (0.000599) (0.00113) (0.000525) (0.000120) (0.000807) (0.00368) 
SDI -9.81e-06 -0.000519 -0.00515 0.000352 0.000124 5.75e-05 0.000193* 0.000905 0.00219 
  (0.000178) (0.00137) (0.00809) (0.000523) (0.00108) (0.000267) (0.000105) (0.000749) (0.00277) 
NOW 0.000183*** 0.00103*** 0.00226** 0.000316*** 0.000484** 2.00e-05 0.000108*** 0.000618*** 0.00112 
  (3.34e-05) (0.000255) (0.00104) (0.000109) (0.000222) (7.00e-05) (2.30e-05) (0.000187) (0.000713) 
DNW -0.000104 -0.00208** -0.0109** 0.000227 -0.00111* -0.000160 -8.85e-05 -0.00123** -0.00464 
  (0.000104) (0.000831) (0.00472) (0.000368) (0.000652) (0.000568) (6.63e-05) (0.000528) (0.00329) 
SAR 6.67e-05* 0.000571 0.00269 7.26e-05 0.000586 7.80e-05 3.46e-05* 0.000197 0.00152 
  (3.70e-05) (0.000364) (0.00262) (8.56e-05) (0.000360) (0.000251) (2.07e-05) (0.000193) (0.00124) 
MME 0.000355** 0.00235** 0.0121** 0.000818* 0.00131 -0.000111 0.000227** 0.00160** 0.00316 
  (0.000177) (0.00112) (0.00595) (0.000460) (0.000828) (0.000358) (0.000109) (0.000687) (0.00322) 
DIST -0.000515*** -0.00318*** -0.0125 -0.000906** -0.00219* -0.000329 -0.000290*** -0.00132** -0.00463 
  (0.000134) (0.00106) (0.00818) (0.000394) (0.00120) (0.00111) (7.77e-05) (0.000590) (0.00457) 
COM 0.000279 0.00141 0.00400 0.000574 0.00134 0.000119 0.000321** 0.00197* 0.00212 
  (0.000194) (0.00132) (0.00622) (0.000598) (0.00102) (0.000415) (0.000129) (0.00111) (0.00308) 
CON 0.000663** 0.00379** \ 8.49e-05 0.000496 \ 0.000300* 0.00222* \ 
  (0.000279) (0.00187) \ (0.000517) (0.000803) \ (0.000153) (0.00116) \ 
COL 0.000606*** 0.00126 0.0142* 0.000378 -0.000315 -5.65e-05 0.000133 -7.83e-05 0.000200 
  (0.000228) (0.00137) (0.00752) (0.000487) (0.000840) (0.000245) (0.000114) (0.000642) (0.00220) 
CCL 0.000286 0.00139 0.00280 \ \ \ 4.14e-05 0.000177 -0.00136 
  (0.000244) (0.00191) (0.00859) \ \ \ (0.000154) (0.00116) (0.00314) 
FTA -0.000139 -0.000982 -0.00301 -0.00107 -0.000451 0.000159 -0.000200 -0.00144 -0.000571 
  (0.000258) (0.00159) (0.00860) (0.000789) (0.00121) (0.000421) (0.000182) (0.00117) (0.00357) 
GAT 0.000146 0.000453 0.000644 9.98e-05 -0.000217 -8.67e-05 4.65e-05 0.000154 -3.59e-05 
  (0.000133) (0.000938) (0.00435) (0.000380) (0.000810) (0.000278) (7.76e-05) (0.000544) (0.00175) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
  
Table A-6. Marginal effects of coefficients in Table 3.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig full rel. dyads contig 
                    
multi_vw -8.61e-05** -0.00101*** -0.00503** 
  
  
   
 
(3.96e-05) (0.000356) (0.00211) 
  
  
   multi_ 
oil&gas   
 
  -6.39e-05 -0.000392 -2.35e-05 
   
 
  
 
  (0.000120) (0.000274) (9.08e-05) 
   multi_ 
total   
 
  
  
  0.000143** 0.00117** -0.00506 
 
  
 
  
  
  (7.21e-05) (0.000528) (0.00446) 
NYP -1.44e-05*** 
-6.75e-
05*** -0.000376*** -2.66e-05*** -3.97e-05** -4.96e-06 -7.91e-06*** 
-4.32e-
05*** -0.000273*** 
 
(3.06e-06) (1.93e-05) (0.000141) (8.16e-06) (1.69e-05) (1.65e-05) (1.85e-06) (1.14e-05) (0.000104) 
UNC -0.000713*** -0.00313* -0.0216 0.000409 0.000220 3.55e-05 -0.000281** -0.00131* 0.00372 
 
(0.000247) (0.00184) (0.0138) (0.000550) (0.00114) (0.000121) (0.000120) (0.000798) (0.00461) 
SDI -3.65e-05 -0.000903 -0.00755 0.000352 0.000321 5.91e-05 0.000171* 0.000521 0.00146 
 
(0.000178) (0.00141) (0.00929) (0.000529) (0.00111) (0.000260) (0.000103) (0.000710) (0.00237) 
NOW 0.000181*** 0.00103*** 0.00253** 0.000312*** 0.000477** 1.50e-05 0.000105*** 0.000575*** 0.00114 
 
(3.39e-05) (0.000253) (0.00112) (0.000109) (0.000220) (5.73e-05) (2.26e-05) (0.000167) (0.000699) 
DNW -0.000133 -0.00228** -0.0118** 0.000201 -0.00112* -0.000119 -7.04e-05 -0.00110** -0.00599 
 
(0.000111) (0.000893) (0.00540) (0.000365) (0.000655) (0.000451) (6.32e-05) (0.000467) (0.00387) 
SAR 4.72e-05 0.000366 0.00103 7.38e-05 0.000509 5.72e-05 4.22e-05** 0.000233 0.00160 
 
(3.70e-05) (0.000367) (0.00296) (8.39e-05) (0.000343) (0.000207) (2.02e-05) (0.000184) (0.00150) 
MME 0.000342** 0.00220** 0.0143** 0.000768* 0.00112 -7.87e-05 0.000229** 0.00158** 0.00288 
 
(0.000167) (0.00108) (0.00710) (0.000455) (0.000802) (0.000283) (0.000108) (0.000649) (0.00326) 
DIST -0.000484*** -0.00264*** -0.00778 -0.000840** -0.00157 -0.000210 -0.000291*** -0.00101* -0.00465 
 
(0.000129) (0.000998) (0.00932) (0.000405) (0.00106) (0.000769) (7.78e-05) (0.000550) (0.00562) 
COM 0.000256 0.00125 0.00201 0.000534 0.00111 6.19e-05 0.000300** 0.00156 0.00316 
 
(0.000189) (0.00137) (0.00735) (0.000579) (0.00102) (0.000234) (0.000123) (0.000955) (0.00328) 
CON 0.000572** 0.00295*  \ 0.000166 0.000916 \  0.000303** 0.00250** \ 
 
(0.000267) (0.00170)  \ (0.000522) (0.000924)  \ (0.000149) (0.00113) \ 
COL 0.000571** 0.000770 0.0108 0.000249 -0.000799 -7.69e-05 0.000158 -2.41e-05 -4.49e-05 
 
(0.000225) (0.00139) (0.00805) (0.000480) (0.000907) (0.000298) (0.000116) (0.000655) (0.00232) 
CCL 0.000317 0.00158 0.00540 \ \ \ 5.56e-05 0.000722 -0.000319 
 
(0.000239) (0.00188) (0.00890) \ \ \ (0.000149) (0.000987) (0.00257) 
FTA -0.000148 -0.00123 -0.00552 -0.00111 -0.000656 0.000103 -0.000188 -0.00132 -0.00204 
 
(0.000253) (0.00161) (0.00896) (0.000745) (0.00119) (0.000322) (0.000173) (0.00106) (0.00440) 
GAT 0.000126 0.000224 0.000863 0.000148 -0.000222 -7.09e-05 7.56e-05 0.000487 0.000177 
  (0.000130) (0.000979) (0.00487) (0.000368) (0.000814) (0.000271) (7.61e-05) (0.000534) (0.00182) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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